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Abstract:  John Maynard Keynes was and still is one of the world’s most famous economists.  
One of the most fascinating stories about Keynes appeared in his obituary in the 1946 
Proceedings of the British Academy.  The story stated that during World War I with minimal 
financial resources Keynes broke the Spanish-British foreign exchange market, a manipulation 
that is illegal today.  This research investigates if the story is myth or truth.  Archival materials 
suggest Keynes did manipulate this foreign exchange market in April of 1918 and he potentially 
earned £8 million on his trades. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
John Maynard Keynes, who lived from 1883 to 1946, was and still is one of the world’s 
most famous economists.  His life included numerous highlights; from marrying a star ballerina 
to recreating the world’s financial system at Bretton Woods in 1944.  His books, from the 
Economic Consequences of the Peace (Keynes, 1920) to The General Theory (Keynes, 1936) 
were best sellers that are still read and argued about today.  From 1912 to 1944 he was a major 
arbiter of what economists read and discussed as editor of The Economic Journal. 
For economists one of the most fascinating stories about Keynes was first told by two of 
the British government’s most senior financial officials, Sir Otto Niemeyer and Sir Richard 
Hopkins, in Keynes’ obituary notice that appeared in the Proceedings of the British Academy.1 
There was urgent need for Spanish pesetas.  With difficulty a smallish sum was 
raked up.  Keynes duly reported this, and a relieved Secretary of the Treasury 
remarked that at any rate for a short time we had a supply of pesetas.  “Oh no!” 
said Keynes.  “What!” said his horrified chief.  “I’ve sold them all again:  I’m 
going to break the market.” And he did. (Pigou, 1946, p. 402) 
 
This shows that with minimal resources Keynes was able to move financial markets.  It is 
important for two reasons.  First, the story is an economist’s ultimate fantasy.  Many economists 
daily explain supply and demand, or predict what will happen to supply and demand.  However, 
the story shows the brilliant Mr. Keynes was able to actually move supply and demand at his 
will. 
Second, as the next section shows, the story was recounted with admiration by Sir 
Niemeyer and Sir Hopkins.  Keynes’ alleged market manipulation happened a century ago.  
Today, that same manipulation would be grounds for universal condemnation by government 
officials, hefty fines and a long jail term.  The story, whether true or not, shows how opinions 
about insider trading and market manipulation have changed dramatically in just a few 
generations. 
The story was subsequently recounted by Roy Harrod in Keynes’ official biography 
(1951, pg. 203).  Harrod does not provide any more details or dates, but put this story 
                                                          
1
 Keynes’ obituary notice was created by A.C. Pigou.  It consists of a number of remembrances 
by friends and colleagues about various aspects of his life.  Niemeyer and Hopkins’ piece is 
titled “Public Servant.” 
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immediately after a letter from Keynes to his mother dated July 17, 1915, implying that he broke 
the market shortly after 1915. 
Beyond the official biography this story is recounted in many places.  It is in Heilbroner’s 
(1999) “Worldly Philosophers,” a very popular book that recounts the lives and ideas of key 
economists.  The identical story is in Spiegel (1991, pg. 602), another classic book that relates 
the history of economic thought.  The story is a key entry for Keynes in Wikipedia, the online 
encyclopedia. 
No matter how many times the story is retold, however, it is important to investigate and 
determine if the story is a myth or has truth. 
II. ARE THE STORY’S SOURCES TRUSTWORTHY? 
Before investigating the veracity of the story’s details it is important to check if the 
people relating the story are trustworthy.  Sir Otto Niemeyer and Keynes were first connected 
after each graduated from college.  Keynes took the British civil service exam when he was not 
certain if he wanted to go into government service or academia.  He placed second overall on the 
exam.  Niemeyer placed first and went into the British Treasury.  This examination was where 
Keynes placed eighth or ninth on the economics portion of the test.  He later quipped that “I 
evidently knew more about Economics than my examiners.”2 
After taking the exam Niemeyer rose quickly through the ranks of the Treasury and in the 
1920s became Controller of Finance, which is similar in rank to Assistant Secretary of Treasury 
in the U.S.  Then in 1927 he switched from the Treasury to a position in the Bank of England 
where he was a Director, which is one level down from the top position.  During the 1930s he 
took a simultaneous position as a Director at the Bank of International Settlements in 
Switzerland.  He was also chairman of governors at the London School of Economics, a position 
similar to chairman of the board in the U.S. (The Times, 1971). 
Sir Richard Hopkins spent much of his working life in the British Treasury.  He rose 
through the ranks in various Internal Revenue departments, which oversaw British tax collection.  
He culminated his career with a position from 1942 to 1945 as the Treasury’s Permanent 
Secretary, which is the department’s top position (The Times, 1955). 
                                                          
2
 http://www.maynardkeynes.org/john-maynard-keynes-economist-1905-to-1914.html 
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These biographies indicate that the story comes from two men who attained some of the 
highest positions of responsibility in the British government’s financial institutions.  The story’s 
sources are trustworthy individuals; this suggests the incident happened.  Nevertheless, 
remembrances about a deceased person are often excessively positive and the story’s details 
must be checked. 
III. KEYNES, CURRENCY AND WORLD WAR I 
Keynes spent much time and thought on currency.  Before the war in 1913 Keynes was 
appointed secretary of a Commission to examine Indian Finance and Currency.  This led Keynes 
to publish his first book (1913) entitled “Indian Currency and Finance.” 
Keynes’ first post in the Treasury during World War I was Assistant to Sir George Paish, 
who was special advisor to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  It is doubtful that Keynes carried 
out the peseta trade during this posting from January to May of 1915 since his work for Sir Paish 
was to explain why consumer prices were rising rapidly in Britain and to determine if the general 
public’s ability to convert British pounds into gold freely should be suspended (Keynes, 1971, 
pg. 57). 
In May 1915 Keynes was transferred to the Treasury’s First, or Finance, Division.  Then 
on September 1, 1915 (Keynes, 1971, pg. 116) Keynes was promoted to second in command of 
the Finance Division, serving under Malcom Ramsay.  Ramsay was the Assistant Secretary in 
charge of banking, currency exchange and allied finances.  This position gave Keynes a potential 
position to execute the peseta trade, but as second in command he was not as likely to act with 
the impunity the story ascribes.  Moreover, the story states the meeting happened between 
Keynes and his “horrified chief” who was the “Secretary of the Treasury.”  Ramsay was the 
Assistant Secretary, not the Secretary. 
In early 1917 Keynes was promoted again.  From February 1917 to January 1919 he was 
head of the “A” division.  In the “A” division Keynes had a staff of 17 (Keynes, 1971, pg. 223) 
and was responsible for all of Britain’s inter-allied financial arrangements.  Keynes boasted after 
the war that “all the money we either lent or borrowed passed through my hands” (Keynes, 1971, 
pg. 3).  As chief of financial arrangements with other countries Keynes was in an ideal position 
to act with relative impunity.  In this job Keynes reported to Robert Chalmers, who was the 
“Joint Permanent Secretary of the Treasury” (Dostaler, 2007, pg. 138), which better matches the 
title of his chief in the story. 
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If Keynes did in fact “break the market,” it would have likely made him feel very 
confident in his ability to trade in foreign exchange.  After the war he speculated in foreign 
exchange, and lost a fortune before recovering.  Moggridge (1983), writing about Keynes as an 
investor states, after the war “Keynes’s activities were centered on the foreign exchange market.” 
In January 1920 Keynes organized a syndicate of friends and family to speculate in the 
foreign exchange markets.  The syndicate initially raised £30,000 to use for trading and was co-
led by Oswald “Foxy” Falk, who worked for Keynes in the Treasury’s “A” division.3  The 
syndicate initially did quite well by shorting the French Franc and going long in Indian Rupees.  
By the end of April the fund had about £17,000 in realized and unrealized gains.  However, the 
markets turned quickly against Keynes and the syndicate was shut down in the summer of 1920 
with losses of almost £23,000.  Keynes lost so much money in the foreign exchange markets that 
1920 was the only time in his life he had a negative net worth (Moggridge, 1983, Table 3). 
Keynes’ focus on trading foreign exchange after the war, his relative ease raising money 
for speculating in foreign exchange and his ability to convince a wartime Treasury employee to 
participate all support the idea Keynes had once successfully manipulated the foreign exchange 
market.  The most likely time when this occurred is between February 1917 and January 1919, 
while Keynes was head of the “A” division. 
IV. THEORETICALLY WHAT HAPPENED? 
Figure 1 shows in graphical form what Keynes was alleged to have done.  The graph has 
two axes because foreign exchange can be quoted using one unit of home currency as the quote 
or one unit of foreign currency.  The left axis shows how many British pounds were needed to 
purchase one Spanish peseta.  Readers should focus on the right hand axis, which has an inverted 
scale, because foreign exchange in London was quoted during World War I as the number of 
foreign units for one British pound. 
Assume the market is in equilibrium at point A just before the story begins.  The first 
action causes a left shift in supply curve (Supply1 to Supply2) when a “smallish sum was raked 
up.”  The equilibrium moves from A to B and supply shifts left because Keynes begins to hoard 
pesetas removing Spanish currency from the market. 
                                                          
3
 Keynes fell out with Falk later in life (Millmow, 2012). 
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The next change is a sudden right shift in the supply curve (Supply2 to Supply3) when 
Keynes “sold them all again.”  This shifts the equilibrium from B to C because Keynes takes the 
hoarded pesetas and suddenly floods the market with a large supply of currency. 
When Keynes breaks the market (Supply2 to Supply3) the exchange rate needs to shift 
from a low number, like 21 pesetas, to a higher number, like 23 pesetas.  The reason for the 
number becoming higher is seen in a simple example.  Assume before Keynes’ action that 
Englishmen were able to buy a dozen Spanish oranges for 21 pesetas.  By flooding the market 
with Spanish money Keynes made the peseta cheaper (each peseta was worth less).  Cheaper 
money means Englishmen should be able to buy more oranges for every British pound they held.  
If the rate changed to 19 pesetas per British pound then Englishmen could not afford the dozen 
oranges, which is logically backward from the story.  However, increasing the rate to 23 pesetas 
results in Englishmen being able to buy the dozen oranges and still have 2 pesetas left over. 
Finally, the supply curve shifts left (Supply3 to Supply1) as Keynes repurchases pesetas to 
fulfill the original “urgent need for Spanish pesetas.”  This repurchase, which allows the British 
government to pay its debts, moves the market to point D which is close to or the same as the 
original point A that existed before Keynes’ market manipulations. 
Fig. 1. Changes in Supply and Demand for Spanish Pesetas Caused By Market Manipulation 
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If Keynes was able to move the supply curve we should see the exchange rate move from 
a number like 22 pesetas per pound to 21 pesetas as Keynes hoarded currency (Point A to B).  
Then the exchange quote should make a sharp movement from a low number, like 21 pesetas per 
pound to a higher number, like 23 (Point B to C; Price P1 to P2) when Keynes dumped a large 
quantity of currency on the market (Quantity Q1 to Q2).  Then, just as sharply the peseta should 
return to a lower number like 22, when Keynes ran out of money to continue manipulating the 
market (Point C to D).  The exchange rate should follow a “И” shaped pattern. 
V. PESETA TO POUND EXCHANGE RATE 
The key newspaper that Keynes read was The Times of London (The Times Digital 
Archive 1785-1985).  The Times typically had a single page each day devoted to financial 
dealings.  Every day from Monday to Saturday The Times had a column entitled the “Money 
Market” that tracked both foreign exchange rates and interest rates. 
Foreign exchange rates for both purchase and sale were quoted daily from a variety of 
key cities outside of England.  The Spanish rate was quoted from Madrid.  Once or twice a week, 
often on Friday’s The Times also published the rate British banks were willing to cable money 
abroad.  These British rates were either very close to the rates quoted daily from foreign cities or 
identical.  Because the cable rates do not occur as frequently as the Madrid quotes, this research 
only uses the Madrid numbers. 
The rates quoted in the “Money Market” column were always the amount of foreign 
currency one British pound was worth.  British readers interested in the amount of currency that 
one Spanish peseta purchased needed to do their own math.  The Spanish peseta was subdivided 
into 100 céntimos.  Gadea and Sabate (2004) point out that between 1883 and 1931 the Spanish 
peseta was a fiat currency with a flexible exchange rate regime. 
Figure 2 shows a picture of the foreign exchange table printed in the Tuesday June 6, 
1916 newspaper on page 14.  In the table the left hand number is the buy price and the right hand 
figure is the sell price.  For example, on June 5
th
 the pound, found on the line labeled Madrid, 
was being bought by Spanish banks and money changers in that city at 22 pesetas and 75 
céntimos.  The same banks and money changers were selling each pound for 22 pesetas and 95 
céntimos, netting them a 20 céntimo profit, called the spread, on every British pound they could 
buy and immediately resell. 
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Fig. 2. Foreign Exchange Table from “The Times”; June 6, 1916. 
 
Every buy and sell quote for Madrid during the World War I period was recorded in a 
spreadsheet.  This results in 1,265 days of data.  A small number of typological mistakes appear 
in the foreign exchange record.  For example, the May 22, 1915 table has a quote to buy of 25p 
05 and sell of 25p 00.  If this quote were accurate a trader with British pounds could make an 
infinite amount of money by simply buying pesetas and then immediately selling the pesetas 
back for British pounds.  The raw data were fixed to correct six obvious typographical errors.
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Figure 3 graphs the number of Spanish pesetas that one British pound purchased using 
the daily buy price quoted each day in the Times.  The figure shows that at the start of World 
War I, one British pound purchased about 25 Spanish pesetas.  Close to the war’s end in 1917 the 
British pound purchased just 17 pesetas, a drop of about one-third in value. 
                                                          
4
 Two of the six corrections fixed sell quotes that were below buy quotes.  The dates of the 
correction were May 22, 1915 and July 26, 1915.  One correction fixed the dates associated with 
the quotes of September 22, 1915.  Three corrections fixed quotes where the typesetter appears 
to change the leading number like 19p to 18p.  The dates of these three fixes were November 10, 
1914, November 10, 1916, and August 15, 1919. 
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Fig. 3. Exchange Rate between Spanish Peseta and One British Pound: 1914 to 1918. 
 
It is doubtful that changes in the exchange rate tracked by figure 3 were caused by British 
government policy.  Atkin (2005) states clearly that the Spanish – British exchange rate was not 
one of the key ones for Great Britain during World War I.  Second, there were no currency 
controls even though there were other controls such as the prohibition of buying foreign 
securities.
5
  Third, the British government attempted to manipulate the pound-dollar exchange 
rate because it wanted to lower the cost of buying things from the U.S.A., but the key committee 
in charge has no record of influencing the Spanish peseta. 
VI. POSSIBLE DATES FOR THE MANIPULATION 
One method of finding a possible date for the episode is to visually look for times when 
the exchange rate had a sharp change in price over a very short time period and then returned to 
roughly its original value.  Visually, four time periods stand out.  Each is circled on figure 3. 
The visual method is ad-hoc.  A second more formal method of finding a likely date for 
Keynes’ alleged peseta trade is to see if there are any newspaper stories that state an unexpected 
or suspicious movement in the exchange rate.  Table 1 lists all stories published in the business 
section of “The Times” that had a headline about the Spanish exchange rate during the war 
period. 
                                                          
5
 Defense of the Realm Regulation 41D in Nov. 1917. 
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All the articles except one contained bland and understated comments about the peseta.  
The exception was an article on June 6, 1916, which matches event #1.  The article’s title is 
“Money Market: Fall in the Spanish Exchange” and it states “The most interesting movement in 
the foreign exchange was a heavy fall in the Spanish rate.”  The article had no further 
explanation.  Examining many of the articles written in Money Market columns both before and 
after this article shows the column rarely contained adjectives like “interesting,” suggesting this 
was a unique occurrence worthy of comment. 
Table 1 
Headlines in “The Times” about the Spanish Peseta during World War I. 
Date Headline 
25 July 1914 Spanish Exchange: The Increasing Value of the Peseta 
6 June 1916 Money Market: Fall in the Spanish Exchange 
6 Dec. 1916 Money Market: Spanish Exchange Weak 
19 Jan. 1917 Spain: Trade Balance Improved 
13 Jun. 1917 City Notes. Rubles and Pesetas 
20 Aug. 1917 Money Market: Spanish Exchange Weak 
27 Aug. 1917 Money Market: Sharp Rise in Spanish Exchange 
22 Jan. 1918 Spain: Industrial Progress 
19 Mar. 1918 Money Market: Low Spanish Exchange 
19 Apr. 1918 City Notes. The Spanish Exchange 
19 June 1918 Money Market: Fall in the Peseta 
27 Nov. 1918 Money Market: Further Fall in the Peseta 
11 Dec. 1918 Money Market: Rise in the Peseta 
16 Dec. 1918 Money Market: Fall in the Peseta 
21 Dec. 1918 Money Market: Rise in the Peseta 
Notes: The list was created by doing business section searches for articles with a 
title of peseta, pesetas or Spanish exchange.  Searches were also done for stories 
with peseta in the article and a title of Spain or Spanish. 
 
A third method of seeking a date for Keynes’ alleged market manipulation is to compute 
the percentage change in exchange rates over one, two, three and four day periods.  These 
percentage changes show how much money Keynes could have made when the market rose 
(point B to C in figure 1) and then fell (point C to D).  The percentage change method identifies 
April 15, 1918 (event #4) as the date when Keynes could have made the most money.  Over a 
one day period Keynes could have made profits of almost 6%; over a two day period about 8%; 
over a three day period 9%; and over a four day period almost 12%.  The second most likely 
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period identified by this method is June 5, 1916 (event #1), during which Keynes could have 
made around 4% a day. 
The final method is to look at the spread between the buy and sell price, illustrated in 
Figure 4.  Manipulating the market typically results in a widening spread, because most of the 
activity is occurring on just one side of the market.  For example, if Keynes wanted to sell a lot 
of pesetas there would likely be fewer participants willing to buy a large quantity, forcing the 
buy and sell price to diverge.  When people become skittish because they don’t know what is 
going on, they demand more of a premium between the buy and sell price to entice them to trade. 
Figure 4 shows a 2 peseta difference at the war’s beginning between the buy and sell 
price, which was an 8% difference.  The spread rapidly shrank after the early uncertainty and by 
1915 the spread fell to around 0.2 peseta.  By 1916 the spread was often 0.1 peseta.  Imposed on 
Figure 4 are the four ovals from Figure 2, which track potential times for market manipulation. 
Event #3 occurs close to but after a large spread.  Only event #4 shows a large increase in 
the buy-sell spread for multiple days in a row at the same time as the exchange rate moves 
dramatically, which would have allowed Keynes to make a large profit.   
While the ad-hoc visual method indicates four occasions of sharp changes in the 
exchange rate, the three more formal methods do not identify events #2 or #3 as possible times 
when Keynes could have manipulated the market.  The next section reviews the important news 
stories during all four events, and suggests only event #4 fits the story of Keynes manipulating 
the market. 
Fig. 4. Spread in Pesetas between the Buy and Sell Rates: 1914 to 1918. 
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VII. HISTORICAL EVENTS DURING THE FOUR TIME PERIODS 
Sharp rises and falls in foreign exchange rates could occur because of important news 
events, rather than market manipulations.  Table 2 contains the day-by-day foreign exchange 
values for event #1 in early June 1916, and the associated headlines from “The Times” 
newspaper.  If Keynes manipulated the market the most likely dates were from Saturday June 3
rd
 
until Tuesday June 6, 1916.  The table shows the pound on Saturday was worth 23 peseta and 73 
centimos.  Over the next two trading days the pound was worth almost 1 peseta less, before 
recovering some of its value.  The pound experienced a 4.1% drop in value followed by a 2.4% 
rebound, suggesting someone who timed the market well would have made over a 6% gain.  
However, the exchange rates follow only a V shape pattern, and not the И shape suggested by 
the story. 
Table 2 
Spanish Peseta Prices during early June 1916. 
Date Madrid Buy 
Madrid 
Sell Spread 
% 
Change Times Headlines 
June 3, 1916 23 p 73 23p 83 0.10  
Great Naval Battle.  Heavy 
Losses.  Six British Cruisers 
Sunk.  Eight Destroyers Lost 
June 4, 1916 Markets Closed    
June 5, 1916 22 p 75 22p 95 0.20 -4.1% 
Nearing a Crisis in Verdun.  
German Bid for the Inner Lines.  
Furious Battles on the East 
June 6, 1916 23 p 30 23p 50 0.20 +2.4% 
Russia Moves.  Heavy Defeat of 
Austrians 
June 7, 1916 23 p 40 23p 50 0.10 0.4% 
Death of Lord Kitchener. Lost in 
Sunken Cruiser. A Mission to 
Russia 
 
The news headlines from “The Times” suggest that the changes in the exchange rate were 
not caused by Keynes but instead by dramatic war news.  On Saturday June 3
rd
 the press reported 
a large naval battle in the North Sea, off the coast of the Netherlands.  In that battle the Germans 
sneaked up on the British navy through heavy fog.  The newspaper reported 14 large British 
ships were lost, but only one German ship was sunk.  On Monday, June 5
th
 the newspaper 
reported British ground forces near Verdun were being overrun by the German army.  The news 
turned more optimistic on Tuesday June 6
th
 with news of Russian forces defeating the Austrian 
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army.  Overall, during these four days, currency traders were hearing dramatic news about the 
war. 
Keynes’ personal life also makes event #1 an unlikely time for him to have manipulated 
the markets.  The headlines of June 7
th
 report the death of Lord Kitchener and his party, who 
were traveling to Russia.  Lord Kitchener was the Cabinet Secretary in charge of war, a position 
equal to the U.S.’s Secretary of Defense.  Kitchener’s boat struck a mine the night of June 5th and 
sank, losing almost everyone on board.  According to his official papers “Keynes had been 
working with members of the party and until the last moment had expected to accompany them” 
(Keynes, 1971, pg. 188).  It is difficult to believe Keynes would have manipulated financial 
markets when he was expecting to be out of touch at sea and preparing for important 
international negotiations. 
Event #2 occurred at the end of November and the beginning of December 1916.  On 
November 30
th
 the exchange rate was 23 pesetas to the pound.  The rate hit a low of 22 pesetas 
on December 5
th
 and bounced back to 23 by December 14
th
.  During this time period British 
Prime Minister Asquith resigned on December 4
th
 and a new government headed by David Lloyd 
George was installed on December 7
th
.  It is unlikely event #2 was when Keynes manipulated the 
market, first because the political events provide a simple explanation for the exchange rate 
movements.  Second, the exchange rate fell just 4%.  This fall took four trading days to occur 
and the subsequent 4% rise took eight trading days.  An 8% gain over a period of almost two 
weeks likely would not be called breaking the market by contemporaries. 
Event #3 occurred in September and early October of 1917.  On September 4
th
 the 
exchange rate was 21.45 pesetas to the pound.  The rate hit a low of 19.9 pesetas on September 
28
th
 and bounced back to 20.43 by October 4
th
.  During this time period England’s ally, Russia, 
experienced dramatic changes.  The general in charge of all Russian forces, Lvar Kornilov, 
attempted a coup against the government.  Alexander Kerenstky, the head of the provisional 
government, declared himself dictator.  Many Bolsheviks were freed from jail.  Like event #2, it 
is difficult to match event #3 with the story since the rise and fall took a month to occur and by 
trading at the exact high and low moments Keynes could have made about 10%. 
Event #4 occurred in mid-April 1918.  Table 3 contains the day-by-day foreign exchange 
values for mid-April 1918, which is the most likely time frame for the story.  If Keynes 
manipulated the market the most likely dates were from Monday April 8
th
 to April 24
th
, a 15-day 
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trading period, not counting the two Sundays when trading did not occur.  In this time frame the 
exchange rate follows the И shaped pattern suggested by the story, with the rate dropping by 
almost 13% (18p 27 to 15p 95), rising by about 12% (15p 95 to 17p 90), and finally falling by 
about 6% (17p 90 to 16p 86).  Trading once a day, at the recorded prices, would result in over a 
30% profit. 
Table 3 
Spanish Peseta Prices during mid-April 1918. 
Day Madrid Buy Madrid Sell Spread 
% 
Change 
 
Times Headlines 
4/8/1918 18p 27 18p 37 0.10  -0.4% The Allied Front in Picardy 
4/9/1918 18p 17 18p 26 0.09  
-0.5% 
Arras Again Threatened.  Great 
German Gunfire 
4/10/1918 17p 93 18p 03 0.10  
-1.3% 
Battle in the North.  German 
Advance to the Lys. 
4/11/1918 17p 45 17p 70 0.25  
-2.7% 
The Northern Battles.  Fight for 
Messines Ridge.  The Recapture 
of Givenchy. 
4/12/1918 17p 30 17p 45 0.15  
-0.9% 
The Threat in the North.  Hard 
Fighting At Messines Ridge 
4/13/1918 16p 96 17p 20 0.24  
-2.0% 
Pressure on Bailleul.  Northern 
Thrust Deepens.  Loss of 
Merville 
4/14/1918 Market Closed    
4/15/1918 15p 95 16p 25 0.30  
-6.0% 
Germans Held for Two Days On 
Northern Front 
4/16/1918 16p 10 16p 15 0.05  +0.9% The Battles of Merville 
4/17/1918 16p 60 17p 05 0.45  +3.1% Loss of the Ridge 
4/18/1918 17p 60 18p 05 0.45  
+6.0% 
French in the Battle. Great Fight 
for Ypres Hill. 
4/19/1918 17p 65 17p 80 0.15  
+0.3% 
Fight For Givenchy. Germans 
Heavily Beaten 
4/20/1918 17p 90 18p 20 0.30  
+1.4% 
The Battle of Givenchy. Heavy 
German Defeat. Enemy at a 
Standstill. 
4/21/1918 Market  Closed    
4/22/1918 17p 75 18p 05 0.30  
-0.8% 
Ireland and Compulsion. 
Canada’s Duty to Her Soldiers.  
Calling Up Order Signed.” 
4/23/1918 17p 20 17p 45 0.25  
-3.1% 
Great Air Fights.  The Death of 
Richthofen. 
4/24/1918 16p 86 16p 95 0.09  
-2.0% 
Great Naval Raid. Belgian Ports 
Attacked. Success Near Robecq 
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Headlines in “The Times” of England show no major news during event #4’s time frame 
that would significantly change the British-Spanish exchange rate.
6
  Around April 13, 1918 the 
major stories in the paper were about battles on the Northern front near Armentieres, Givenchy, 
and Ypres, which are all small towns located near the French-Belgian border.  The stories are 
roughly evenly split between British success, stalemate and loss.  Moreover, the stories suggest 
that relatively small amounts of land were being lost or gained. 
The other major news topics during event #4 were discussions about conscripting more 
men to fight.  Early in the war drafting men was not necessary since so many volunteered to 
fight.  However, as the war dragged on and the death toll mounted, drafting able-bodied men 
became necessary.  Bills were passed in Parliament requiring Irish men to fight and both Canada 
and England reduced the types of reasons that excluded men from serving. 
Examining the news headlines for the four possible events suggests that if Keynes 
manipulated the market the most likely time was event #4, during mid-April of 1918.   Event #1 
is not likely because Keynes was expecting to be on a boat to Russia during the dates it occurred.  
Event #2 is not likely because it has the least increase in spread among the four possible events 
and does not follow a “И” shaped pattern.  Event #3 is not likely because the spread narrows 
after the exchange rates begin to make a large movement.  Additionally, while event #3 begins 
with a strong downward movement in the exchange, the upward jump is relatively small and 
would likely not lead contemporaries to believe Keynes “broke the market.”  Only event #4 
follows the “И” shaped pattern and has a large enough movement to make the event memorable. 
VIII. DOES A MEMO EXIST ON THE INCIDENT? 
The optimal solution for verifying the story is to find a memo written by Keynes about 
the incident.  Known letters, memos and books written by Keynes are collected in a 30-volume 
set published by Cambridge University Press (Keynes, 1971).  Searching the volumes covering 
his first period of time at the Treasury shows no mention of the incident.  Volume 16, chapter 3 
of the 30-volume set contains a memo that Keynes wrote called “Inter-allied finance, 1917-
1918.”  This memo discusses in great detail the problems if Britain abandoned a fixed exchange 
rate between the pound and gold bullion.  Keynes was quite proud of the stability of British 
exchange rates and wrote, “To point out the depreciation of the German exchanges and the 
                                                          
6
 Unlike today, “The Times” published the major news during the war in the middle of the 
newspaper, typically on pages 6 and 7.  The front page had birth, marriage and death notices. 
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stability of our own has been our favourite form of propaganda in all parts of the world” 
(Keynes, 1971). 
This stability was not created by law, but instead by constant intervention in the foreign 
exchange markets.  Keynes wrote at the beginning of World War II, “In the last war there was no 
exchange control as such,….there were free dealings over the exchange at a rate which was 
‘pegged’ by the Treasury, unlimited dollars being supplied at this rate” (Keynes, 1971). 
A second source of information is the official Archives of the Treasury Department.  All 
Treasury records from the World War I period have been moved to the United Kingdom’s 
National Archives.  Simon Fowler,
7
 an ex-employee who previously worked in the Archives for 
30 years and who specialized in World War I materials was hired but his search did not turn up 
any memo on the affair.  The author also spent time at the National Archives and did not uncover 
any memo.  While a memo might exist, the archives’ WWI Treasury papers are filed by topic, 
not by date.  Moreover, the topics were decided after the war by low level clerks and recorded in 
cursive writings in large ledgers.  Many of the entries are almost illegible making finding a 
particular memo an extremely difficult task. 
A third source is Keynes’ personal papers in the Archive Center of King's College at 
Cambridge University where Keynes taught for many years.  Papers from his Treasury years of 
1915 to 1919
8
, informal discussions in 1914
9
 leading up to the job and even letters to friends and 
family are all extensively catalogued.  His personal papers strongly suggest he manipulated the 
market during event #4, April 1918. 
The first evidence for manipulation is found in Keynes’ frequent correspondence to his 
mother.  This correspondence eliminates events #1, #2, and #3 and provides a tantalizing clue 
about event #4.  Just after event #1, Keynes writes to his mother that “you will have read in the 
paper that Kitchener and all his party for Russia were mined yesterday…..It is believed that they 
are all drowned.  It is a most dreadful shock, as I’ve been working intimately for the last week or 
two with all of them. ….. it has been a narrow escape for me, because as you know, I was 
                                                          
7
 The archivist’s website is http://www.history-man.co.uk. 
8
 http://janus.lib.cam.ac.uk/db/node.xsp?id=EAD%2FGBR%2F0272%2FPP%2FJMK%2FT 
9
 http://janus.lib.cam.ac.uk/db/node.xsp?id=EAD%2FGBR%2F0272%2FPP%2FJMK%2FET 
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originally, fixed up to go.”10  This letter suggests before event #1 Keynes spent most of his time 
planning for the Russian meetings and after thinking about his potential demise. 
It is doubtful that he manipulated the market during event #2 since the key news he 
reports home is that “I have had a munificent cold and a long memorandum to write for the War 
Com[ittee].  So I have served both causes by staying at home to-day to write this letter.  But I 
think I shall be prudent to stay at home tomorrow also (Sunday) and not travel, - particularly as I 
have great deal of work which I can quietly clear off in my study here.”11  It is doubtful Keynes 
manipulated the market during days when he was sick in bed. 
Event #3 occurred in September and early October of 1917.  It is almost impossible for 
Keynes to have manipulated the market during this time because during most of this time he was 
traveling to and from the United States.  Keynes was scrupulous about putting the location where 
he was writing from on all his personal correspondence.  His letter his mother on September 2, 
1917 was written from “The Wharf”12 and states he is about to sail on an ocean “liner, the ‘St. 
Louis’, which has been kept waiting for us since Saturday.”  At the end of September he writes 
from the “Metropolitan Club, Washington D.C.” that his trip was unexpectedly extended because 
Lord “Reading demanded that I should stay ten days beyond the week originally allowed.”13  In 
the middle of October he writes to his mother from the middle of the North Atlantic describing 
first that he “went a thousand miles by rail to Halifax and picked up the boat there” and then got 
on one of “Seven great liner[s], with a total population I suppose approaching 20,000, steaming 
in formation with a cruiser at their head and two destroyers on their flanks.”14 
Event #4 occurred in mid-April 1918.  Keynes wrote a letter home
15
 on April 22
nd
 which 
mentions having lunch first with a Romanian Prince and then the Prince of Monaco.  The next 
letter home was on the 10
th
 of May.  This letter begins with apologies for not writing sooner and 
mentions he is looking forward to visiting his Bloomsbury friends Clive and Vanessa Bell at 
their Charleston farmhouse.
16
  Keynes then pens one of the strangest lines in his personal 
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 Archive letter June 6, 1916 JMK/PP/45/168/8/145. 
11
 Archive letter December 2, 1916, JMK/PP/45/168/8/195. 
12
 Archive letter September 2, 1917 JMK/PP/45/168/9/39 
13
 Archive letter September 28, 1917 JMK/PP/45/168/9/142 
14
 Archive letter October 15, 1917 JMK/PP/45/168/9/145. 
15
 Archive letter April 22, 1918 JMK/PP/45/168/9/95. 
16
 http://www.charleston.org.uk/ 
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correspondence “I have done my best for cheese for you and have now agreed to the purchase of 
£8,000,000 worth.”17 
Keynes was not involved in procuring cheese for the war effort.  He had some dealings 
with the U.S. in procuring wheat, but primarily focused on financial issues.  Today, when 
someone talks about cheese they are most likely talking about a food made from curdled milk.  
However, the original Oxford English dictionary first published in 1889 has a second entry for 
the noun cheese and defines it as “wealth and fame” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2015) 
suggesting a very different use of the word in Keynes’ time. 
Moreover, Keynes in chapter 17 of the General Theory equates green cheese with fresh 
or new money.  He writes “men cannot be employed when the object of desire (i.e. money) is 
something which cannot be produced and the demand for which cannot be readily choked off. 
There is no remedy but to persuade the public that green cheese is practically the same thing and 
to have a green cheese factory (i.e. a central bank) under public control.” 
Keynes’ letters to his mother suggest sometime around event #4 he made about £8 
million of money. 
IX. TREASURY MEMOS 
Keynes also kept some of his Treasury memos from the April 1918 time frame.  In mid-
April Keynes received a letter from Basil Blackett who was the United Kingdom’s Treasury 
representative for the British War Mission in Washington D.C.  Blackett’s letter is quite lengthy 
but near the end describes new debts owed by the British government for over 10 million U.S. 
dollars.  The debts were for wool from Boston and New Zealand, Russian artillery shells, 
Japanese compasses, and over $300,000 worth of pyrites.  The next section shows pyrites, which 
are needed for producing sulfur and sulfuric acid, were imported by the United Kingdom during 
WWI from Spain. 
The end of Blackett’s letter highlights a potential crisis by stating “Spanish exchange in 
particular and the depreciation of the dollar in terms of neutral currencies generally are exciting 
steadily increasing interest.  ….  So do not be surprised if this matter suddenly becomes acute.”18 
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 Archive letter May 10, 1918 front page of the letter is JML/PP/45/168/9/97 and back page 
JML/PP/45/168/9/98. 
18
 Keynes Archive April 12, 1918 JMK/T/1/111. 
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The most convincing evidence, however, are memos to and from Mr. E. F. Davies, 
manager of London County Westminster & Parr’s Bank Ltd.  This bank is the forerunner of one 
of Britain’s big five’ banks: National Westminster.19  The memos show on April 6, 1918 Keynes 
and Davies are planning on intervening in the Spanish Peseta market.  However, Davies is 
concerned that the operation might go awry and asks Keynes to write the following memo to his 
bank’s directors absolving him and the bank of any liability should the operation fail. 
“respecting Spanish Exchange, we shall be obliged if you will kindly 
undertake to receive the equivalent in French Gold of £250,000 in Paris, 
and forward same to Madrid, attending to the necessary details….It is 
our desire to steady the Spanish exchange, …. It is distinctly understood 
that there is no responsibility or risk whatever attached to the bank in 
connection with this operation, and should the object in view not be 
achieved, neither Mr. Davies nor the bank will be held in any way 
responsible.” 
On April 10
th
 Keynes writes back to Davies and tells him “we must abandon the project 
for the time being.”20  The reason for the temporary delay is that the bank’s directors did not give 
permission for Davies to travel to Madrid to personally intervene in the foreign exchange market.  
There are unfortunately, no memos from two weeks later when the Spanish Peseta’s exchange 
rate experienced dramatic fluctuations.  Nevertheless, it is doubtful a simple standard exchange 
of Pounds for Peseta’s would need the directors of a major bank to weigh in unless Keynes and 
Davies were plotting to manipulate the market beyond simply steadying the exchange rate. 
X. TRADE STATISTICS 
The story states that “a smallish sum was raked up.”  How much was a smallish sum?  
Since a memo does not appear to exist, other methods of determining how much money Keynes 
used are needed.  One method of determining the sum is to use trade figures.  The left side of 
Table 4 shows the United Kingdom’s total imports, exports and the trade deficit with Spain 
around World War I. 
In 1913, before the War began, the United Kingdom imported £13.4 million worth of 
goods and services from Spain.  In 1916, during the middle of the war, imports had grown to £24 
million.  British imports continued to grow as the war progressed and reached over £30 million 
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 http://heritagearchives.rbs.com/companies/list/westminster-bank-ltd.html 
20
 Keynes Archive April 10, 1918 JMK/PP/T1/93. 
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by 1918.  During the same time frame British exports shrank.  In 1913 British exports to Spain 
were valued at £7.9 million, but by 1918 exports had fallen to £3.9 million. 
Table 4 
British Imports and Exports to and from Spain in Millions Pounds Sterling 
Year Total 
Imports 
Total 
Exports 
Trade 
Deficit 
Pyrites 
Imported 
Iron Ore 
Imported 
Coal 
Exported 
1913 £13.4 £7.9 £5.5 £1.0 £4.5 £2.1 
1914 13.2 6.4 6.8 1.0 3.2 1.8 
1915 17.8 6.2 11.6 1.3 4.6 1.6 
1916 24.1 8.5 15.5 1.9 7.3 2.8 
1917 21.8 4.8 17.0 2.0 8.3 1.1 
1918 30.3 3.9 26.4 2.2 9.0 0.8 
1919 33.2 11.1 22.1 0.9 7.7 2.4 
Total 
1914-1918 107.1 29.7 77.4 8.5 32.4 8.3 
Notes: Source is Board of Trade (1929).  Imports were items imported for use in 
the United Kingdom and were not trans-shipped to other countries. 
 
In the middle column’s bottom row is the figure £77.4 million pounds sterling.  This 
represents England’s total trade deficit during World War I with Spain.  While this figure 
appears large, Keynes, writing over a year before hostilities ended, states the British Treasury 
had spent £5.1 billion on the war (Keynes, 1971, pg. 248).  Making the extreme assumption that 
Keynes was responsible for paying 100% of the trade deficit puts an upper bound of £77 million 
on the amount of money Keynes had to manipulate the market. 
The £77 million figure is a misleading overestimate because total import and export 
figures combine private and government purchases.  Keynes, however, would only have needed 
to pay for the British government’s expenditures with Spain, not all British trade during the war 
years.  While private international trade was more difficult during the war it did continue.  For 
example, Britain imported over £150 thousand in paint colours and pigments during the war 
from Spain and exported to Spain over £50 thousand of soap, products not crucial for the war 
effort.  Second, in 1918, Keynes was probably not paying for expenses incurred in the first years 
of the war, but only for more recent purchases. 
The right side of table 4 contains the values of the most important imports and exports 
during the war years.  A key British export, which earned the country pesetas, was coal.  The top 
five imports, which comprised almost two-thirds of all imports during the war were: iron ore; 
20 
 
oranges; sheets and bars of lead; iron pyrite and onions (Statistical Office of the Customs and 
Excise Department, 1919, table 10).  Iron ore, pyrite and lead were important ingredients in 
making arms and munitions. 
Oranges and onions are not listed in table 4 because after the war the government 
published an extensive document (House of Commons, 1921) listing what was purchased for the 
war effort and where the items originated.  The report specifically states that oranges were 
bought from Italy and onions were purchased for the war effort from California. 
The Ministry of Munitions on page 94 of the report states they purchased pyrite, also 
called fool’s gold, but does not identify the country.  However, six lines later they make a special 
note that the Ministry had to pay excess freight charges on coal to Spain.  A specific country is 
likely not identified because the British government purchased pyrite from both local
21
 and 
foreign mines during the war.  Lead and iron ore are not mentioned in the report. 
After the war the government also published a special extremely detailed report on the 
raw and finished materials used in the war effort (House of Commons, 1920).  For example it 
shows the British government purchased 164 million pairs of socks and 62 million pairs of boots 
for the war effort.  This report does not list either lead or iron ore as one of the raw materials the 
government directly purchased. 
Secret War Cabinet papers (National Archives, 1917), which have been declassified, 
contain a set of memos from 1917 entitled “Conveyance of Iron Ore from Spain.”  The memos 
show British officials trying to figure out if it was possible to move iron ore from Spain overland 
to a Northern French port.  The set’s concluding memo closes the discussion by stating there are 
not enough trains and people available to implement the idea.  These memos suggest the British 
government wanted to buy Spanish ore directly, but could not for logistical reasons. 
Iron ore is mentioned in the War Cabinet report that summarized 1918.  The report states 
“An agreement on commercial matters had been signed with Spain late in 1917 and worked well 
throughout the year, enabling the United Kingdom to draw much needed supplies of iron ore and 
other necessaries” (The War Cabinet, 1919, pg. 31).  Unfortunately, no further details on the 
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agreement were found.  The lack of any direct mention in the summary procurement reports 
produced after the war suggests the government was not directly purchasing the ore from Spain.  
Instead, the memos found make it appear likely that private companies bought the ore and sold 
the resulting iron and steel to the government. 
Trade figures, shown in table 4, reveal during the war total British imports of Spanish 
pyrite were £8.5 million, iron ore imports were £32.4 million and coal exports were £8.3 million.  
Making the extreme assumption that Keynes was responsible for paying 100% of the difference 
between pyrite and iron ore imports and coal exports produces an upper bound figure of £32.6 
million, which is less than half the total trade deficit of £77 million. 
XI. HOW BIG WAS THE TRADE? 
The section on trade statistics produced a rough upper bound figure of £32.6 million on 
the amount of money Keynes was using to manipulate the market.  This figure does not match 
the story’s statement that “a smallish sum was raked up.”  This section provides evidence that the 
figure Keynes had at his disposal was in the thousands, not millions, of pounds. 
After the war ended the United Kingdom revealed how much it owed Spain.  On April 
23, 1919, about six months after the War ended, “The Times” (1919) mentioned in a very short 
newspaper article that the British government arranged to borrow from Spain 75 million pesetas, 
which was worth £3 million, at 5 percent interest.  The negotiations included two special trade 
clauses.  First, Spain could ship oranges to England without any import duties.  Second, England 
could ship to Spain 150,000 tons of coal a month without any duties.  The duration of the loan is 
not mentioned. 
The trade figures suggested that Keynes was trying to pay off part of the trade deficit by 
paying current bills.  However, using trade figures is misleading.  During 1918 Keynes was in 
charge of the “A” division.  Sir Thomas Heath (1927), one of three permanent Secretaries to the 
Treasury during the war years, wrote a detailed account of the functions of each office.  Keynes 
and the other officials working the “A” division were not in charge of paying bills.  Instead they 
were in charge of borrowing and lending money to finance the government.  Keynes states this 
clearly in his previously mentioned quip that “all the money we either lent or borrowed passed 
through my hands.”  Paying bills was the province of the Supply or “C” Division. 
Since Keynes acted as a banker it is extremely likely that the “smallish” funds Keynes 
needed were enough pesetas to pay off the interest and potentially some of the principal owed on 
22 
 
Britain’s debt with Spain during the war.  While the loan’s terms are not known, a realistic 
assumption is that Keynes was making quarterly payments of both principal and interest on a 
debt of £3 million at 5%. 
If the loan was due in two years he needed about £400,000 per quarter.  If the loan was 
due in five he needed about £170,000.  These figures suggest Keynes likely had in the vicinity of 
£250,000 worth of Spanish currency to “break the market,” which is the figure mentioned in the 
memo written by the bank manager Mr. E. F. Davies, two weeks before the manipulation. 
XII. DID KEYNES PERSONNALLY PROFIT? 
Materials in Keynes’ personal archive suggest he did not personally profit from the trade.  
Examining his income tax forms show a steadily rising amount of money with no sharp spikes 
around 1918.  While today’s personal tax forms cover a calendar year, Keynes’ forms show he 
was taxed on income from the last six months of one year and the first six months of the next.  
His tax forms show his reported income was £772 in 1917-1918,
22
 £827 pounds in 1918-1919,
23
 
and £903 in 1919-1920.
24
 
Reported income on tax forms are not always a reliable measure of actual income.  A 
better indication if Keynes profited are his seven trading ledgers.  In these ledgers he recorded 
every stock, bond, currency and commodity he bought or sold for his personal account during his 
entire life.  The ledgers are extremely detailed and include entries for all dividends and interest 
he earned. 
Ledger entries
25
 during the 1910s and 1920s show an active trader in larger currencies 
like US dollars, French francs, Indian rupees and even smaller currencies like the Norwegian 
Kroner and Danish Krona starting in 1919. There is no entry in the personal ledgers for Spanish 
Pesetas either during WWI or after.  During 1918 Keynes was primarily invested in banks, like 
Barclay’s, the Canadian Pacific Railroad, and Rio Tinto mining. 
Income tax forms and his personal trading ledgers suggest that while he earned a small 
fortune for King and country, Keynes did not make any money for himself. 
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XIII. CONCLUSION 
Foreign exchange markets are some of the world’s largest financial markets.  Currently, 
over $5.3 trillion of currency is traded every day (Bank for International Settlements, 2014).  The 
world’s daily GDP is currently around $0.2 trillion (World Bank, 2014).  In simple terms, 
roughly twenty-six times as much currency is traded every day as the world’s actual production. 
Today it is impossible for a “smallish sum” to roil the foreign exchange markets since 
they are so large.  However, in 1918 the data strongly suggest that John Maynard Keynes was 
able to take roughly £250,000 and turn it into £8 million, a thirty two times return.  This 
extraordinary feat led him after the war to create a syndicate for trading foreign currency.  
Unfortunately, for Keynes and his partners the syndicates’ foreign exchange trades were the 
opposite of Keynes’ Peseta trade and the syndicate folded with heavy losses. 
Why are there so few notes and memos about this temporary disruption in the exchange 
rate between the British pound and the Spanish peseta market?  Keynes likely was trying to 
prevent a scandal.  In October 25, 1918 Keynes was at a conference of the French Treasury 
representatives.  The official meeting minutes record that Keynes said “that we were at present 
supporting the peseta at 22.30.  If conditions continued to be favorable we might advance this 
figure perhaps in gradual stages to as much as 22.75.  He hoped that the French would see their 
way to support the franc-peseta exchange at an equivalent rate.”26  Keynes’ officially was one of 
the United Kingdom’s key people trying to minimize fluctuations in the Peseta’s exchange rate.  
It would have been scandalous to have a paper trail showing that he was manipulating the very 
exchange rate that on record he was officially trying to stabilize. 
The story’s key point was that Keynes broke the market, but what constitutes breaking a 
market is never defined.  If breaking means a major disruption then simply looking at the peseta-
pound exchange rate graph shows no time during World War I when the market stopped trading 
and resumed at a very different price.  However, if breaking the market means an interruption of 
continuity then the graph clearly shows the market was disrupted. 
While the story was told to bolster Keynes’ reputation after his death, the event raises 
troubling moral questions.  What if the market manipulation had failed and instead of making a 
large profit, Keynes had lost most of the “smallish sum” and the “urgent need for Spanish 
pesetas” could not be met?  Was it ethical for Keynes to have manipulated the market even if his 
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motives were solely to make a profit for King and country, with no personal gain expected?  The 
recounting of the story is too brief to answer these questions, but the phrase “his horrified chief” 
suggests these kinds of concerns were on the minds of Keynes’ superiors. 
The evidence indicates the story is extremely credible and that Keynes profitably 
manipulated the pound-peseta market in April 1918.  However, the idea that he “broke” the 
market is an exaggeration meant to burnish Keynes’ post-mortem reputation. 
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